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I. Introduction 
Start with a story. Two young women, Andrea and Hannah, 
were on vacation in St. Tropez.1 They met up with a male friend 
who was in a band, had cocktails at a bar on the beach, took a stroll 
                                                                                                             
* Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. My thanks to the 
attendees of A Workshop on Federal Privacy Regulation at New York 
University School of Law on October 2, 2009, and to the symposium on Internet 
Expression in the 21st Century: Where Technology & Law Collide at Widener 
University School of Law in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on February 22, 2010, 
where I presented earlier versions of this paper. Aislinn Black, danah boyd, 
Danielle Citron, William McGeveran, and Lior Strahilevitz provided useful 
suggestions in conversation. Dominic Mauro provided research assistance. This 
essay is available for reuse under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United 
States license.  For further information on the license, see Creative Commons — 
Attribution 3.0 United States, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/ 
(last visited May 14, 2010). 
1 James Tapper, Saint Bono and the Angels of St Tropez; but What Will the 
U2 Singer's Wife Have to Say About His Partying with Two Teenage Girls?, 
MAIL ON SUNDAY (London), Oct. 26, 2008, at 3, available at 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-1080636/What-St-Bonos-wife-
say-partying-teenage-girls.html. 
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along the shore, and ended up on a private yacht as the sun went 
down.2 It was a good day. 
I know all of this because Andrea posted her photos on 
Facebook.3 This in itself might not have been a big deal, except 
that her musician friend was named Bono and his band was an 
outfit called U2.4 The tabloids jumped at the chance to run pictures 
of the middle-aged rocker partying in the sun with two nymphets 
whose ages combined added up to less than his.5 So much for a 
private little walk on the beach. 
The story is noteworthy because it features a celebrity, but 
similar things happen on social software everyday.6 An education 
major lost her teaching placement–and with it her degree–after a 
photo of her as a " 'drunken pirate' " along with an unflattering 
MySpace post came to the attention of her school's 
superintendent.7 Another college student faced criminal charges 
after the police used Facebook to link him to a friend he denied 
                                                                                                             
2 Tapper, supra note 1, at 3. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 See James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 
1164-65 (2009) (describing instances where disclosure on Facebook has caused 
harm). See generally danah michele boyd, Taken Out of Context: American 
Teen Sociality in Networked Publics (Fall 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of California, Berkley), http://www.danah.org/papers/ 
TakenOutOfContext.pdf (describing social networks and communities); Chris 
Peterson, Losing Face: An Environmental Analysis of Privacy on Facebook 
(Jan. 2010) (unpublished draft on file with author) (using Facebook as a case 
study). In this essay, I will use Facebook as the leading example, but most of the 
discussion will be relevant to other social software as well. I will also presume 
familiarity with Facebook. For an overview of Facebook, see Grimmelmann, 
supra, at 1144-49; Welcome to Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/ (last 
visited May 14, 2010). I will use the umbrella terms 'social software' and 'social 
media' to describe websites and other computer applications designed to 
facilitate social interactions. These terms include social network sites like 
Facebook and also include blogs, Twitter, ChatRoulette, instant message 
programs, texting, and a whole ocean of other new software-based 
communications media. See generally CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY 
(2008) (giving examples of social software). 
7 See Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
97943, at *12-22 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008). 
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knowing.8 Say the wrong thing on Facebook–or rather, say it 
without realizing who might see it–and you could lose your job.9 
The smaller losses of dignity are so routine that there are now 
entire websites devoted to cataloguing them.10 On Facebook, 
Andrea is an everywoman. 
This essay will take up two questions suggested by Andrea's 
example: is the loss of privacy in social media something 
lawmakers ought to worry about and, if so, what should they do? 
Part II will answer the first question with a clear yes: users want 
privacy, deserve privacy, and cannot easily secure privacy for 
themselves. Part III will suggest, somewhat more tentatively, that 
lawmakers could benefit from thinking about the problem of 
privacy in social software as one of safe product design. I will use 
Facebook as the principal example, with Andrea's story11 serving 
as a recurring motif. Near the end of this article, I will illustrate 
that my theory is not Facebook-specific by showing that it also 
helps us make sense out of a recent privacy controversy involving 
Google Buzz. 
II. THE MYTHS OF PRIVACY ON FACEBOOK 
The first question raised by Andrea's story is whether there is 
a problem here at all. The very fact that so much personal 
information is available on Facebook could be an argument against 
legal intervention. How so? Here are three things one might say 
about privacy in social software, using Andrea as a representative 
example of her fellow users: 
                                                                                                             
8 See Jodi S. Cohen, Cop Snares College Pals in Own Web, CHI. TRIB., 
Aug. 3, 2006, at C1. 
9 See John Gonzalez, Cold Eagles Sure Are Thin-Skinned, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Mar. 9, 2009, at E02 (describing how a Philadelphia Eagles employee 
was fired after criticizing the decision to trade a football player on Facebook). 
10 They are often referred to as 'fails.' See Facebook Fail Blog – Funny 
Profiles, Photos, Status Updates, Comments, Groups, and Pages, 
http://facebookfails.com/ (last visited May 14, 2010); Failbooking – Funny 
Facebook Status Messages (Failbook), http://failbooking.com/ (last visited May 
14, 2010). 
11 See supra text accompanying notes 1-5. The references to Andrea 
throughout the rest of this article are pulled from the illustration used in the 
introduction of this essay. Id. 
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x Andrea does not care about privacy. 
x Andrea makes rational privacy choices. 
x Andrea's desire for privacy is unrealistic. 
If even one of these claims is true, then the law should keep its 
hands off. If Andrea does not want privacy, the law should not 
force it on her. If she wants privacy but is capable of securing it for 
herself, then she does not need help from the law. If she wants 
privacy in the same unrealistic way that five-year-olds want to be 
surgeon princesses and astronaut ninjas, then there is little the law 
could do about it.  
In reality though, all three of these claims are false.12 They are 
myths about privacy.13 Users of Facebook care passionately about 
privacy, but they have great trouble achieving it.14 That trouble is 
not their fault; it arises out of the quite natural difficulty they have 
in understanding what will happen to their personal information 
once they post it.15 However, a substantial part of what they mean 
by 'privacy' is readily achievable–at least most of the time.16 
To these three myths about privacy on Facebook, we should 
add a fourth half-myth about privacy law and Facebook: 
x Regulating Facebook as a database will solve Andrea's 
privacy problems. 
It is true that Facebook and other social network sites have 
enormous databases of personal information on their users.17 It is 
also true that privacy law can and should prevent misuse of those 
databases–so Facebook, for example, should be required to take 
reasonable steps to secure its site from hackers. But the social 
nature of this social software means that database regulation alone 
is insufficient–and, indeed, can be counterproductive if not 
carefully handled.18 Database regulation is thus a half-myth: a 
good idea, but also a distraction from other privacy issues.19 
                                                                                                             
12 See infra pt. II.A-D. 
13 See id. 
14 See infra pt. II.A. 
15 See id. 
16 See id. 
17 See Harry Lewis, How Facebook Spells the End of Privacy, BOSTON 
GLOBE, June 14, 2008, at A11. 
18 See infra pt. II.D. 
19 See id. 
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A. Myth 1: Facebook Users Don't Care About Privacy 
Webster's New World Dictionary selected "overshare" as its 
"2008 Word of the Year."20 As its press release explained, "[I]n an 
era of online social networking and instant digital broadcasts, this 
type of unsolicited and often embarrassing communication is an 
inescapable sign of the times."21  That is certainly true on 
Facebook: there are days–perhaps most days–when the site can 
seem like a single global case of TMI.22 Whether it is women 
posting their bra colors,23 bosses posting pink slips,24 or people's 
simple narcissism,25 you can find it all on Facebook. 
This let-it-all-hang-out attitude seems, on its face, flatly 
inconsistent with anything resembling privacy as we have 
traditionally understood it, leading to the obvious conclusion that 
the Facebook generation has turned its back on privacy. As 
columnist Robert J. Samuelson wrote, "[M]illions of Americans 
are gleefully discarding–or at least cheerfully compromising–their 
right to privacy. . . . People seem to crave popularity or celebrity 
more than they fear the loss of privacy."26 Or, as Emily Nussbaum 
summed up the "disgusted, dismissive squawk" of an "older 
generation": "Kids today. They have no sense of shame. They have 
                                                                                                             
20 Press Release, Webster's New World, Overshare Is Webster's New World 
Dictionary's 2008 Word of the Year (Dec. 1, 2008), http://newworldword.com/ 
press-release-overshare-is-word-of-the-year/. 
21 Id. 
22 "Too [m]uch [i]nformation." Urban Dictionary: tmi, 
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=tmi (last visited May 14, 
2010). 
23 See Posting of Hortense to Jezebel, http://jezebel.com/ (Jan. 9, 2010, 
12:40 EST). 
24 See Woman Fired via Facebook After Rant, WORLD NEWS AUSTL., Aug. 
10, 2009, http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/1070187/Woman-fired-via-
Facebook-after-rant. 
25 See How Does Facebook Make Overt Self Obsession Ok?, 
METEUPHORIC, Feb. 4, 2010, http://meteuphoric.wordpress.com/. See generally 
Christine Rosen, Virtual Friendship and the New Narcissism, NEW ATLANTIS, 
Summer 2007, at 15, available at http://www.thenewatlantis.com/docLib/ 
TNA17-Rosen.pdf (discussing digital self-portraits and their relation to virtual 
friends). 
26 Robert J. Samuelson, A Web of Exhibitionists, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 
2006, at A25. 
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no sense of privacy. They are show-offs, fame whores, 
pornographic little loons who post their diaries, their phone 
numbers, their stupid poetry – for God's sake, their dirty photos! – 
online."27 
Behind the generation gap and the apprehension of a socially 
disruptive new technology, there is a genuine sociological theory at 
work here. It asserts that the kids these days simply do not care 
about privacy. A collection of attitudes–personal dignity, post-
Nixonian suspicion of government surveillance, patience with 
slower analog media, and willingness to think about the future–that 
kept older generations from revealing too much about themselves 
have all fallen by the wayside. Meanwhile, mass culture is now 
dominated by Jersey Shore,28 The Real Housewives,29 Celebrity 
Rehab,30 and other reality TV offerings that conflate public 
exposure with personal fulfillment. There is little wonder that 
today's teens and young adults see only benefits in sharing their 
every move online, with little concern for the consequences of 
foregone privacy. Facebook use is just a symptom of an underlying 
unconcern for the private–visible confirmation that oversharing is 
the new black. 
It is an elegant theory, except for the inconvenient fact that it 
does not fit the available data. Actual Facebook users act in ways 
that indicate that they very much care about privacy. When 
Facebook rolled out News Feed, there were massive user protests 
to the point that Mark Zuckerberg had to apologize to the 
Facebook community.31 The same thing happened a year later with 
Facebook's Beacon advertising system32 and a year after that with 
                                                                                                             
27 Emily Nussbaum, Say Everything, N.Y. MAG., Feb. 12, 2007, 
http://nymag.com/news/features/27341/index1.html. 
28 Jersey Shore (MTV television broadcast). 
29 The Real Housewives of Atlanta (Bravo television broadcast); The Real 
Housewives of New Jersey (Bravo television broadcast); The Real Housewives of 
New York City (Bravo television broadcast); The Real Housewives of Orange 
County (Bravo television broadcast). 
30 Celebrity Rehab (VH1 television broadcast). 
31 See Tracy Samantha Schmidt, Inside the Backlash Against         
Facebook, TIME, Sept. 6, 2006, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/ 
0,8599,1532225,00.html. 
32 See Louise Story & Brad Stone, Facebook Retreats on Online Tracking, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2007, at C1. 
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a change to its data-retention policy.33 Meanwhile, when Facebook 
users find out that others are looking at their Facebook profiles, 
such as employers,34 relatives,35 or police,36 they also object.37 
These are the protests of people for whom privacy matters. 
It is not cheap talk. Facebook users also act in ways that show 
a regard for privacy. Consider Andrea. Her choice to use Facebook 
was actually a privacy-positive move. Her alternative, after all, was 
the web. Facebook is a controlled network; Andrea chose which 
networks to belong to and whom to 'friend.' She may have failed at 
keeping her pictures private, but she did at least try–and so does 
everyone who uses Facebook and puts any effort into choosing 
friends or adjusting privacy settings. 
In fact, as soon as you scratch beneath the surface of Facebook 
social practices, carefully modulated privacy management is 
everywhere. danah boyd has documented how teens on Facebook, 
MySpace, and other social media use fake profiles, fake names, 
                                                                                                             
33 Bobbie Johnson & Afua Hirsch, Facebook Backtracks After Online 
Privacy Protest, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 9, 2009, at 9, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/feb/19/facebook-personal-data. 
34 See Jeff Cain, Online Social Networking Issues Within Academia and 
Pharmacy Education, AM. J. PHARMACEUTICAL EDUC., Feb. 15, 2008 (citing M. 
Sisson & C. Wiley, Nat'l Ass'n of Colls. & Employers, Ethics, Accuracy, and 
Assumption: The Use of Facebook in Recruiting (May 30, 2007)), available at 
http://www.ajpe.org/view.asp?art=aj720110&pdf=yes (forty-two percent of 
students surveyed considered Facebook use by employers a violation of 
privacy). There are legal risks to the employer just from looking at applicants' 
Facebook profiles: 
Employers, however, may face liability under federal, state and local law for 
using any information learned from social media about an applicant's 
protected class status— race, age, disability, religion, sexual orientation, 
etc.—in a hiring decision. It may be hard for the employer to prove in later 
litigation that it only viewed, but didn't actually use, the information obtained 
in a social medium when making its hiring decision. 
Renee M. Jackson, Social Media Permeate the Employment Life Cycle, NAT'L 
L.J., Jan. 11, 2010, at 16, 16, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/ 
PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202437746082. 
35 See Peterson, supra note 6, at 2 (citation omitted) (quoting Facebook 
user's status update saying " 'my grandmother just friend requested me . . . no. 
Facebook, you have gone too far!' "). 
36 See Cohen, supra note 8. 
37 See Avner Levin & Patricia Sanchez Abril, Two Notions of Privacy 
Online, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1001, 1025-27 (2009). 
800 WIDENER LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19 
fake ages, and a cloud of other minor lies to keep their profiles safe 
from prying (usually parental) eyes while also connecting with 
their peers.38 Meanwhile, college students coming back from a 
night of partying have learned that the first thing they need to do is 
check Facebook and untag their names from any photos of them 
doing keg stands, lest their athletic coaches or campus police catch 
them drinking.39 
The point is not that these "Digital Natives" prize privacy 
above all else or that they experience privacy in the same way 
previous generations did or that the social content of privacy is 
stable.40 The privacy they care about is social and relational, 
perhaps less concerned with databases and governmental 
surveillance than their parents' and grandparents' privacy.41 They 
are constantly trading their privacy off against other social 
opportunities and making pragmatic judgment calls about what to 
reveal and what to keep hidden.42 However, they do care about 
privacy, and they act accordingly. 
B. Myth 2: Facebook Users Make Rational Privacy Choices 
Why, then, does the idea that Facebook users reject privacy 
have such resonance? The ideal appeals, in part, because of a 
related idea: people make rational, cost-benefit tradeoffs when 
evaluating privacy online. If Facebook users are choosing online 
options that lead to low-privacy outcomes, they must have a good 
reason for it. 
Again, the thought has a certain logic to it. Just as it may not 
be rational for people to invest in picking good passwords if 
someone else bears the risk from computer intrusions,43 it may not 
                                                                                                             
38 See boyd, supra note 6, at 148-59. 
39 Lisa Guernsey, Picture Your Name Here, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2008, at 
E6. 
40 See JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING 
THE FIRST GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES 7 (2008) (discussing how young 
Internet users think about privacy and proposing the term "Digital Natives"). 
41 See id. at 7 ("Digital Natives' ideas about privacy, for instance, are 
different from those of their parents and grandparents."). 
42 See id. at 56. 
43 See Cormac Herley, So Long, and No Thanks for the Externalities: The 
Rational Rejection of Security Advice by Users, in QUEEN'S COLL. UNIV. OF 
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be rational for them to invest in privacy.44 This is particularly the 
case if they have something to gain by exposing their personal 
information. In Ed Felten's words, " 'Given the choice between 
dancing pigs and security, users will choose dancing pigs every 
time.' " 45 The behavioral advertising industry (which Facebook 
has been trying mightily to break into), for example, describes 
highly targeted advertising as a benefit to consumers, something 
they willingly seek out.46 If this were right, then we could treat the 
fact that thirty-five percent of Facebook users adjusted their 
privacy settings after its latest design changes as evidence that they 
are carefully reviewing the pros and cons of privacy–that would be 
100,000,000 well-informed users.47 The other sixty-five percent–
some 250,000,000 strong–must have fully approved of Facebook's 
changes.48 
Just as the death of privacy was a myth, however, so too is the 
belief in rational privacy balancing. For one thing, users massively 
misunderstand Facebook's privacy architecture and settings. One 
study found that over half of Facebook users surveyed were 
unaware that their profiles were searchable by millions of other 
Facebook users.49 Another found that two-fifths of Facebook users 
                                                                                                             
OXFORD, UK, 2009 NEW SECURITY PARADIGMS WORKSHOP 133-34 (Richard 
Ford et al. eds., 2010) (arguing that it is rational for users to choose poor 
passwords). 
44 See Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading 
Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 543, 549-50, 565 (2008) 
(arguing that it is rational for users not to read privacy policies). 
45 Mozilla Security Review and Best Practices Guide, 
http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/components/reviewguide.html (last 
visited May 14, 2010). 
46 See generally Eric Goldman, A Coasean Analysis of Marketing, 2006 
WIS. L. REV. 1151 (arguing that well-tailored marketing benefits both consumers 
and advertisers). 
47 See E.B. Boyd, A Third of Facebook Users Customized Their Privacy 
Settings After the Policy Changes (And Why Facebook Thinks That's a Good 
Thing), BAYNEWSER, Jan. 29, 2010, http://www.mediabistro.com/baynewser/ 
privacy/a_third_of_facebook_users_customized_their_privacy_settings_after_ 
the_policy_changes_and_why_facebook_thinks_thats_a_good_thing_ 
150409.asp. 
48 See id. 
49 Alessandro Acquisti & Ralph Gross, Imagined Communities: 
Awareness, Information Sharing, and Privacy on the Facebook, in PRIVACY 
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were willing to add a green plastic frog as a friend.50 The frog's 
name, in a nice touch, was " 'Freddi Staur,' " an anagram for " 'ID 
Fraudster.' "51 Suddenly, the inactivity of the sixty-five percent 
who left their privacy settings untouched sounds less like 
agreement and more like ignorance. Of course, one also starts to 
wonder how effective the choices made by the other thirty-five 
percent were. 
Consider Andrea again: she posted the photos to her 
seemingly private Facebook account, thinking that they would be 
visible only to her friends and networks.52 The trouble is that one 
of her networks was "New York City," whose membership by 
default consisted of anyone in New York City with a Facebook 
account.53 Over 1,000,000 other users were able to view Andrea's 
photos of herself with Bono. It is hard to describe this as a rational 
choice about privacy.54 Facebook itself eventually eliminated this 
'feature' of networks, having presumably concluded that users were 
never going to understand how networks worked.55 
Facebook users who attempt to weigh the privacy costs and 
benefits of each individual act of participation systematically get 
the balance wrong.56 The design of social networking sites plays 
into plenty of well-understood, social cognitive biases. The most 
basic heuristic of privacy self-help–know your audience–is hard to 
                                                                                                             
ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES: SIXTH INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP, PET 2006 
CAMBRIDGE, UK, JUNE 2006 REVISED SELECTED PAPERS 36, 53 (George 
Danezis & Philippe Golle eds., 2006), available at http://privacy.cs.cmu.edu/ 
dataprivacy/projects/facebook/facebook2.pdf. 
50 Sophos Facebook ID Probe Shows 41% of Users Happy to Reveal All to 
Potential Identity Thieves, SOPHOS, Aug. 14, 2007, http://www.sophos.com/ 
pressoffice/news/articles/2007/08/facebook.html. 
51 Id. 
52 Tapper, supra note 1. 
53 Bono's Bikini Party Photos Exposed by Facebook Privacy Flaw, 
SOPHOS, Oct. 29, 2008, http://www.sophos.com/pressoffice/news/articles/ 
2008/10/bono.html [hereinafter Bono's Bikini Party]. 
54 But see Lauren Gelman, Privacy, Free Speech, and "Blurry-Edged" 
Social Networks, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1315, 1316-19 (2009) (describing reasons 
users might choose to post quasi-private material to places viewable by anyone, 
expecting that only those with a legitimate interest will choose to view it). 
55 Posting of Mark Zuckerberg to The Facebook Blog, 
http://blog.facebook.com/ (Dec. 1, 2009, 18:23 EST). 
56 See Grimmelmann, supra note 6, at 1160-64. 
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use in an electronically mediated environment that gives you little 
feedback on who any given communication is visible to. Instead, 
social networking sites activate the subconscious cues that make 
users think they are interacting within bounded, closed, private 
spaces. Indiscretions follow because users are cognitively 
distracted from the work of predicting the social consequences of 
their activities. 
Moreover, in many cases of Facebook privacy trouble, the 
victim has made every reasonable effort to keep the information 
confidential. Miss New Jersey 2007 was blackmailed by someone 
who got a hold of some mildly racy photographs that she posted to 
what she thought was a Facebook photo album restricted to friends 
only.57 As between blackmailer and victim, the fault is clear. 
Similarly, Facebook's ill-fated Beacon advertising program utilized 
users' names and faces to hawk the products that they bought on 
other sites, like Blockbuster or Zappos.58 Nothing in their previous 
online experience would have led them to expect such a model of 
information sharing and exposure.59 
Indeed, the social-network aspects of social media mean that 
even information that people deliberately try to keep offline can 
find its way online. A group of students at MIT were able to 
identify gay users on Facebook with surprisingly high accuracy, 
simply by looking to see whether they had gay friends, even when 
the users themselves had not posted their sexual orientation.60 
Photo tagging is another good example: the entire untagging ritual 
is possible–and necessary–because Facebook allows users to tag 
photos of each other before the taggee has a chance to object.61 
                                                                                                             
57 See Austin Fenner, N.J. Miss in a Fix over Her Pics, N.Y. POST, July 6, 
2007, at 5. 
58 See generally William McGeveran, Disclosure, Endorsement, and 
Identity in Social Marketing, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105 (discussing Beacon). 
59 See generally id. 
60 See Carolyn Y. Johnson, Project 'Gaydar', BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 20, 
2009, http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2009/09/20/project_ 
gaydar_an_mit_experiment_raises_new_questions_about_online_privacy/. 
61 Help Center, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=831 (last 
visited May 14, 2010). 
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C. Myth 3: Facebook Users' Desire for Privacy Is Unrealistic 
If users want privacy and fail in their efforts at obtaining it, it 
is tempting to tell them to stop trying, to dismiss their desire as a 
pipe dream, a relic of the preinformation age. A decade ago, Sun's 
Scott McNeely said, " 'You have zero privacy anyway . . . Get over 
it.' "62 Google's Eric Schmidt echoed the sentiment when he said, 
"If you have something that you don't want anyone to know, 
maybe you shouldn't be doing it in the first place."63 In legal 
filings, his company has argued that "even in [a] desert, complete 
privacy does not exist."64 The argument echoes those made by 
legal scholars such as Richard Posner, who has compared privacy 
"to the efforts of sellers to conceal defects in their products."65 
This too is a myth. It is true that Facebook regularly smashes 
its users' fragile and precious hopes for privacy. Although it may 
be wise to remember that anything posted to the site could become 
public knowledge,66 it does not follow that full and open publicity 
is natural, desirable, or inevitable. Facebook users' desire for 
privacy is realistic, and we should search for ways to help them 
achieve it. 
The vast majority of things posted to Facebook do not wind up 
on the metaphorical front page of the New York Times. Andrea is 
                                                                                                             
62 Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: 'Get Over It', WIRED, Jan. 26, 1999, 
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/01/17538. 
63 Google CEO on Privacy (VIDEO): 'If You Have Something You Don't 
Want Anyone to Know, Maybe You Shouldn't Be Doing It', HUFFINGTON POST, 
Dec. 7, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/07/google-ceo-on-
privacy-if_n_383105.html. It should be noted that this is the same man who 
instituted a company policy against talking to CNET reporters after one of them 
reported details on his family's finances. See Jennifer Westhoven, CNET: We've 
Been Blackballed by Google, CNNMONEY.COM, Aug. 5, 2005, 
http://money.cnn.com/2005/08/05/technology/google_cnet/. 
64 Defendant Google, Inc.'s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion 
to Dismiss Complaint at 2, Boring v. Google, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 695 (W.D. 
Pa. 2008) (No. 08-cv-694). 
65 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 46 (7th ed. 2007). 
66 See Obama Advises Caution in Use of Facebook (YouTube broadcast), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=si1gNXqH7iw (last visited May 14, 2010) ("I 
want everybody here to be careful about what you post on Facebook, because, in 
the YouTube age, whatever you do, it will be pulled up again later somewhere in 
your life."). 
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the exception, not the rule. This should not be a surprise. The site 
is not designed to be fully public, and that is not how people use it. 
Instead, it facilitates back-and-forth conversations among small 
groups,67 social contexts not intended to be intelligible to outsiders, 
and bounded spaces for interaction. The same network structure 
that helps people communicate also predictably limits the spread of 
what they say.68 Facebook's moves towards making more 
information public have been necessary, from Facebook's point of 
view, precisely because people were sharing information less 
widely than the site would have liked.69 
Recognizing this truth about sociality and information-sharing, 
most people are willing to say at least a few things about 
themselves on Facebook that they would not shout from the 
rooftops. They expect not to be harmed, and most of the time, they 
are right.70 At some point, this expectation starts to create its own 
reality–to become the kind of expectation that creates enforceable 
duties at law. Privacy law is full of them, from criminal 
procedure's 'reasonable expectation of privacy'71 to the "reasonable 
person" standard of offensiveness used in the intrusion on 
seclusion,72 public disclosure of private facts,73 and false light74 
torts. 
                                                                                                             
67 Welcome to Facebook, supra note 6 ("Facebook helps you connect and 
share with the people in your life."). 
68 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 919, 958-59 (2005). 
69 Compare Posting of Mike Masnick to Techdirt, 
http://www.techdirt.com/ (May 4, 2009, 13:57 EST) ("Facebook, however, with 
its fine-grained privacy controls . . . is pretty limited in how much it can open 
up. The more it tries to become like Twitter, the more its own setup gets in the 
way."), with Posting of Marshall Kirkpatrick to ReadWriteWeb, 
http://www.readwriteweb.com/ (Jan. 9, 2010, 21:25 EST) ("Now that it has 350 
million people signed up . . . now Facebook decides that the initial, privacy-
centric, contract with users is out of date. That users actually want to share 
openly, with the world at large, and incidentally . . . that it's time for increased 
pageviews and advertising revenue, too."). 
70 See James Grimmelmann, Accidental Privacy Spills, J. INTERNET L., July 
2008, at 3, 10-12 [hereinafter Accidental Privacy Spills]. 
71 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 422 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). 
72 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
73 Id. § 652D(a). 
74 Id. § 652E(a). 
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Indeed, not just privacy law but privacy itself is socially 
constructed in just this way. My anger when you take a 'Wall' post 
and forward it to my employer is grounded in your violation of the 
norms of our relationship–of the social context that defined the 
post in its original venue.75 To treat everything on Facebook as fair 
game is to run a steamroller over the millions of differentiated, 
localized social contexts on Facebook, each with its own norms of 
what is appropriate behavior and how information should flow. 
Those norms are inseparable from the sociality of the site itself: the 
self-expression, relationships, and communities it helps its users 
build.76 People are not really trading off privacy against socializing 
on Facebook so much as using it to define them both, 
simultaneously, in relation to each other. 
Examples may help clarify the point. Take Andrea. Her 
photographs were taken to memorialize a frozen moment. They 
were an attempt to tell the story of her day on the beach with Bono 
with an aura of seemingly unmediated, authentic truth,77 Andrea 
used Facebook as such: she posted the photos to it to make them 
visible to what she thought was a small group of friends.78 The 
closeness of her relationship to those friends was bound up with 
the closeness of her relationship with Bono–the latter became an 
element of the former. Both of these relationships were more 
meaningful to her because of the photographs and because she did 
not indiscriminately show them to the world. When the 
photographs escaped from that social context, their meaning 
changed; suddenly Andrea was a participant in a tabloid driven 
"scandal" about Bono's seemingly debauched behavior.79  When 
interviewed, she protested: "I think that for somebody who's much 
                                                                                                             
75 See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, 
AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 58-62 (2010). 
76 See Grimmelmann, supra note 6, at 1206. 
77 See generally SUSAN SONTAG, ON PHOTOGRAPHY 5 (1977) 
("Photographs furnish evidence. Something we hear about, but doubt, seems 
proven when we're shown a photograph of it."); Opinionator, 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/category/errol-morris/ (last visited May 14, 
2010) (collecting a New York Times series of blog posts by Errol Morris on the 
truthfulness and deceptiveness of photographs). 
78 SONTAG, supra note 77, at 5. 
79 Tapper, supra note 1. 
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older than I am . .no thank you … No . . . God no! He's a friend of 
mine and that's pretty much it."80 
Consider the women who posted their bra colors to 
Facebook.81 The point was to raise awareness of breast cancer;82 
however, had a male coworker approached them the next day and 
said "So you wore a pink bra yesterday; what color are you 
wearing today?" it would have been not just socially inappropriate, 
but potentially actionable as workplace sexual harassment.83 The 
bra-color posts were designed for the social context of Facebook, 
but what is acceptable in one context becomes a privacy violation 
when decontextualized. 
The bra-color example also illustrates the deeper point that 
privacy itself cannot be understood apart from the social contexts 
that make it meaningful.84 The zing of the meme came from 
making 'public' a typically 'private' subject–mirroring the 
consciousness-raising agenda of making breast cancer a political 
subject, rather than just a personal issue for afflicted women. 
Women who posted their bra colors were engaged both in an act of 
self-expression and in conscious affiliation with a larger 
community of women.85 The inappropriateness of the male 
coworker's comment comes not so much from the fact that bra 
color is a private subject as from its violation of the very specific 
way the meme constructs the public/private divide in a socially 
embedded fashion. 
                                                                                                             
80 Tapper, supra note 1. 
81 Posting of Hortense to Jezebel, supra note 23. 
82 Id. 
83 See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-68 (1986) 
(establishing the hostile work environment standard for title VII liability); 
McPherson v. City of Waukegan, 379 F.3d 430, 434, 439 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(finding that questions about the plaintiff's bra color were not actionable 
standing alone, but were "inappropriate" and ultimately considered by the court 
in determining whether the harassment was "pervasive"). 
84 See NISSENBAUM, supra note 75, at 148. 
85 Posting of Hortense to Jezebel, supra note 23. 
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D. Myth 4: Database Regulation Will Make Facebook Privacy-
Safe 
If, as I have been arguing, privacy mistakes are endemic on 
social networking sites, the next question is what the law can and 
should do about it. Much of the time, the answer will be nothing. 
Many privacy harms, embarrassing though they may be, are 
beneath the threshold at which the law ought to take notice. The 
fact that your mother found out your plans to attend International 
Skip School Day is not, and should not be, a legally cognizable 
harm.86 
Moreover, there are often good reasons to let people make 
even serious privacy mistakes. Respecting a person's autonomy to 
make privacy choices requires us to give him or her the freedom to 
fail. Indeed, some privacy mistakes are good for society, like the 
one made by the burglar who checked his Facebook account from 
his victim's computer and forgot to log out.87 Even a privacy 'fail' 
can be an important learning experience. Youthful 
experimentation, bumps and bruises included, is a significant part 
of how people come to understand how privacy works and what it 
means to them.88 
Most of the time, there are good policy reasons for making 
users the stewards of their own online privacy. Privacy is an 
intensely personal good, especially in the social dimensions at 
stake on social networking sites. That means it is impossible for 
anyone but the user to define what privacy is important for him or 
her. The user is also the best-motivated person to protect his or her 
privacy because the user is generally the cheapest cost-avoider. 
Even though the privacy harms of Facebook use are real, so are the 
                                                                                                             
86 See, e.g., Posting of 15 Funny Facebook Fails to Oddee, 
http://www.oddee.com/ (Jan. 11, 2010) (listing fifteen humorous "Facebook 
[f]ails"). 
87 See Edward Marshall, Burglar Leaves His Facebook Page on Victim's 
Computer, JOURNAL (Martinsburg, W. Va.), Sept. 16, 2009, http://www.journal-
news.net/page/content.detail/id/525232.html. 
88 See boyd, supra note 6, at 286 (describing how a teenager's notion of 
privacy is often different from his or her parents' notion of privacy); see also 
Anupam Chander, Youthful Indiscretion in an Internet Age, in THE OFFENSIVE 
INTERNET: SPEECH, PRIVACY, AND REPUTATION (Saul Levmore & Martha C. 
Nussbaum eds., forthcoming Jan. 2011). 
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social benefits–if the walls of your house are made of glass, 
throwing stones is not the solution to your privacy problems. 
That, however, still leaves a substantial rump of cases in 
which legal intervention is justifiable. Some, like Miss New 
Jersey's case of blackmail,89 are easily addressed under existing 
law. Others, like Beacon, are trickier: Blockbuster's participation in 
Beacon clearly violated the Video Privacy Protection Act,90 but 
Zappos and Epicurious are less clearly troublesome given the lack 
of omnibus privacy protections in the United States.91 Many 
harms–Andrea's photographs of herself with Bono come to mind–
may not rise to the level justifying ex post tort liability under 
current law,92 but would be good to prevent ex ante if at all 
possible. 
The dominant modern approach to information privacy 
regulation focuses on limiting misuse of databases.93 In the United 
                                                                                                             
89 See supra text accompanying note 57. 
90 See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1) (2006) (providing for liability against "[a] 
video tape service provider who knowingly discloses" a consumer's personal 
information). 
91 See Jennifer McClennan & Vadim Schick, "O, Privacy" Canada's 
Importance in the Development of the International Data Privacy Regime, 38 
GEO. J. INT'L L. 669, 675 (2007) ("The United States has adopted a much less 
regulated approach to data privacy protection."). 
92 See, e.g., Purcell v. Ewing, 560 F. Supp. 2d. 337, 344 (M.D. Pa. 2008) 
(dismissing a defamation complaint pertaining to statements made about the 
plaintiff on an online message board because "[r]easonable readers of [the 
poster's] comments would understand[] them as the unsubstantiated opinions 
and imprudent tirades of one who harbored intense dislike for [the plaintiff]."). 
In the Bono example, it is not clear that the publication would have been found 
to be 'highly offensive,' even if it was embarrassing. See supra text 
accompanying notes 1-5. Moreover, Bono's celebrity status creates a potential 
newsworthiness defense. See Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 
1975) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652F cmt. f (Tentative 
Draft No. 13, 1967)) (discussing the legal standard for the newsworthiness 
defense). 
93 See, e.g., SEC'Y'S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA SYS., 
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE 
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/DATACNCL/ 
1973privacy/tocprefacemembers.htm (defining " 'fair information practice' "); 
Fair Information Practice Principles, FED. TRADE COMM'N., http://www.ftc.gov/ 
reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm (last visited May 14, 2010) [hereinafter Fair 
Information]. 
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States, the so-called 'Fair Information Practices' are not binding 
law but are used by the Federal Trade Commission and industry 
self-regulation groups to set benchmarks of good conduct.94 In 
Europe, the Data Protection Directive makes them enforceable.95 
The high-level idea is to ensure that personal data is collected only 
with disclosure of the legitimate purposes that it will be used for–
and then to ensure it is used only for those purposes.96 In the words 
of the Data Protection Directive, personal information must be 
"collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not 
further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes."97 
This database frame is useful. The secret, error-riddled, and 
sprawling database has a uniquely Kafkaesque tone.98 The Fair 
Information Practices approach tries to tame the database by 
keeping it open, accurate, and limited to its original uses.99 That is 
a good way of thinking about credit card data or a collection of 
search queries: essential for daily life but highly dangerous in the 
wrong hands (think of a small-town sheriff with personal grudges). 
Informed consent at the time of collection legitimates the primary 
use; secondary uses are forbidden. 
For some threats, the database frame is also a useful way of 
thinking about Facebook. Facebook's huge reservoirs of personal 
information are tempting to outsiders. That is a reason why its 
general counsel told an audience of lawyers that Facebook would 
vigorously contest subpoenas for personal information, saying,      
                                                                                                             
94 See Gaia Bernstein, The Paradoxes of Technological Diffusion: Genetic 
Discrimination and Internet Privacy, 39 CONN. L. REV. 241, 268 (2006) 
("Congress did not implement the FTC's recommendations for legislation 
codifying the fair information practices principles."); see also Fair Information, 
supra note 93, at pt. (A) n.28. 
95 See generally Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC), 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX: 
31995L0046:EN:HTML (discussing "the protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data and . . . the free movement of such data"). 
96 Id. art. 6.1(b). 
97 Id. 
98 See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and 
Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1423 (2001). 
99 See Fair Information, supra note 93, at A.1-.4. 
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" 'We're itching for that fight.' "100  The fear of secondary use is 
also at work when privacy advocates worry that Facebook will turn 
its user data over to third-party advertisers.101 
As useful as the database frame is in thinking about the data 
processing taking place on the back end, it is not so helpful in 
thinking about the social interactions taking place on the front end. 
Neither 'limited data collection,' 'no secondary use,' nor 'full 
disclosure' really gets at the user-user relationships on Facebook. 
In the first place, Facebook's social nature means that there is 
nothing so personal that it is entirely off-limits. A typical Facebook 
profile contains answers to most of the questions employers are not 
allowed to ask of job applicants: race, sex, age, national origin, 
religion, and marital status.102 People are voluntarily uploading it 
all because they are social and because Facebook scratches social 
itches. If you were to tell Facebook that it could not collect these 
types of information, you would kill it. Given the profound social 
benefits that social media offer, that would be a tragic outcome. 
Trying to limit secondary use is also surprisingly difficult. The 
problem comes in defining the original purposes for which the data 
is collected. Defined broadly–in the words of Facebook's mottos, 
to "connect and share with the people in your life"103 or "the power 
to share and make the world more open and connected"104–it is a 
purpose that swallows everything on the site. Everyone who uses 
Facebook gives it personal data for the express purpose of sharing 
that data with other users, which implies that pretty much anything 
other users do or see on the site falls within the original, legitimate 
purpose. 
                                                                                                             
100 Amy Miller, Facebook GC Tells Lawyers He's Looking for a            
Fight, LAW.COM., Feb. 2, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 
1202441887703. 
101 See, e.g., Complaint, Request for Investigation, Injunction, and Other 
Relief at 1, In re Facebook, Inc., F.T.C. (Dec. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.epic.org/privacy/inrefacebook/EPIC-FacebookComplaint.pdf. 
102 See David Phelps, HR and Facebook: It's Complicated, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis, Minn.), Feb. 7, 2010, at 1A (quoting law professor Deborah 
Schmedemann as saying, "If you have that information and if it goes into the 
decisionmaking process, that would be illegal"). 
103 Welcome to Facebook, supra note 6. 
104 Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/facebook (last visited May 14, 
2010). 
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Defining purpose narrowly, on the other hand, would render 
the site unusable. If you think the flood of Facebook notifications 
is bad now, just wait until Facebook asks you for fresh, specific 
consent for each transfer of personal data to an individual user. 
Demanding explicit consent every time information is shared with 
someone other than its specific, original audience could require 
hundreds of prompts, per user, per day. It would make viewing 
one's News Feed or clicking from Wall to Wall impossible. It is, in 
other words, incompatible with the very reasons that people use 
Facebook and other social software.105 
In between those two extremes, however, it is difficult to 
make the concept of 'secondary use' bear much weight. If it means 
'any use not originally contemplated by the user,' then all we have 
managed to do is restate the problem. We got into this mess 
precisely because users have been unable to predict all the ways in 
which their information might be seen. We need a way to get more 
intellectual traction on the question of which uses they expect and 
which ones they do not–and on how to bring their expectations 
more closely in line with reality. 
That sounds like the problem of disclosure, but disclosure as 
usually practiced by commercial data controllers is weak tea in a 
social setting. The law does not demand that friends give each 
other full disclosure of their data collection practices when they are 
catching up to each on the last few months. Transpose that 
conversation to Facebook, and they are still not giving or expecting 
disclosure. The confidences are regulated by implicit social norms, 
rather than by explicit promises. Facebook can easily disclose its 
own practices; however, when it comes to what other users might 
choose to do, it cannot say much more than "anything can 
                                                                                                             
105 See Grimmelmann, supra note 6, at 1151. 
[P]eople have social reasons to participate on social network sites, and these 
social motivations explain both why users value Facebook notwithstanding 
its well-known privacy risks and why they systematically underestimate those 
risks. Facebook provides users with a forum in which they can craft social 
identities, forge reciprocal relationships, and accumulate social capital. These 
are important, even primal, human desires, whose immediacy can trigger 
systematic biases in the mechanisms that people use to evaluate privacy risks. 
Id. 
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happen."106 Again, the database-oriented Fair Information 
Practices approach is not wrong.  It just does not provide enough 
leverage on the specific problem of social privacy in social media. 
III. PRIVACY AS PRODUCT SAFETY 
To review: people use Facebook in complicated ways, 
sometimes leading to privacy trouble. There is often a significant 
gap between what users expect will happen with their personal 
information and what actually does happen. Overall, the beneficial 
uses of Facebook outweigh its dangers, but it would be good to 
find ways of preventing some of the specific privacy harms. 
Facebook probably cannot be made perfectly safe for privacy, but 
it could almost certainly be made safer. 
Put this way, there is a natural affinity between the privacy 
law challenges facing Facebook and another area of the law: 
product safety. It is true that using Facebook can be hazardous to 
your privacy, but a hammer can be hazardous to your thumb. 
People need tools, and sometimes they need dangerous tools. 
Hammers are physically dangerous; Facebook is socially 
dangerous. We should not ban hammers, and we should not ban 
Facebook. The challenge for policymakers is to ensure that the 
tools people do use are not unnecessarily dangerous. 
Thus I would like to suggest that some of the lessons the law 
has learned in dealing with product safety could usefully be 
applied to the analogous problem of privacy safety. Unlike 
database regulations, which tend to focus only on the flow of 
information in itself, a product-safety approach can also consider 
how people use social media. After a survey of previous work on 
this metaphor, this part will tentatively map the products liability 
doctrine onto the problem of making social media safe for privacy. 
The fit is not perfect, but it is surprisingly good. This part will 
conclude with a case study of another recent, high-profile online 
privacy debacle: the launch of Google Buzz.107 I will argue that 
                                                                                                             
106 Privacy Policy, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last 
visited May 14, 2010) ("You understand that information might be re-shared or 
copied by other users."). 
107 See Miguel Helft, Anger Leads to Apology from Google About Buzz, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2010, at B3 [hereinafter Helft, Anger]; Miguel Helft, 
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Buzz was a defective product–one that was unreasonably 
dangerous to personal privacy. 
A. Previous Work 
Despite their different historical roots and paths of 
development in the twentieth century, privacy law and product 
liability law fit squarely within the intellectual and doctrinal 
system of modern tort law. Indeed, the scholar most closely 
identified with the field of torts as a whole, William L. Prosser,108 
played critical roles in the development of both. In the same 
remarkable year, he published both the essential modern 
codification of the privacy torts109 and the authoritative history of 
the rise of strict liability for the sellers of defective products,110 
both of which have been highly influential in the adoption of these 
causes of action by courts.111 As the reporter for the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, he brought both within the Restatement's overall 
doctrinal and intellectual project.112 
Modern scholars have sought to use the Prosser-led 
transformation of products liability law in the 1960s as an 
institutional model for the transformation of privacy law today. 
Eric Jorstad has observed that privacy regulation today looks a lot 
                                                                                                             
Critics Say Google Invades Privacy with New Service, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 
2010, at B1. 
108 See generally WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 
(1941). Professor Prosser was also the reporter for the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts; therefore, it is unsurprising that it bears his influence. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS I (1965) (listing Prosser as the reporter). 
109 See generally William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960) 
(discussing the privacy torts among the fifty states). 
110 See generally William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict 
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) [hereinafter Strict 
Liability]. 
111 See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 
(Cal. 1962) (in bank) (citing Strict Liability, supra note 110, at 1124-34) 
(adopting the rule of strict liability in product liability action). 
112 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-652I (1977) 
(privacy torts), with id. §§ 388-408 (product liability), and id. § 402A(1), (2)(a) 
(imposing liability on the seller of "any product in a defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous to the user . . . although . . . the seller has exercised all 
possible care"). The Restatement thus subjected both areas to its general rules, 
such as its common defenses and remedies. Id. §§ 887-895, 901-932. 
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like product safety regulation before the strict liability and 
regulatory revolution of the 1960s.113 Benjamin Sachs traces the 
connection further back, drawing a parallel between the rise of the 
industrial economy around the turn of the twentieth century and the 
information economy around the turn of the twenty-first century.114 
Their common point about society and the law is that an era in 
which individuals could generally protect themselves has given 
way to an era in which social and technological forces make it far 
harder for consumers to be successful stewards of their own 
safety.115 The law caught up with the changes in how products 
were made and sold; the question we face today is how the law 
will catch up with the changes in how information is made and 
sold. 
When it comes to specific proposals, Sachs argues that data 
collectors should be held strictly liable in tort for failure to secure 
the data they store.116 His emphasis is on back-end data breaches–
harms caused when unauthorized intruders gain access to the 
stored data on users117–and thus can easily be reconciled with the 
database model of privacy discussed above.118 Sarah Ludington, 
also noting the institutional parallel to product safety,119 offers a 
similar proposal of a tort for the misuse of stored personal data, 
one that would explicitly enforce the Fair Information Practices.120 
Other than the historical parallel, the product safety metaphor 
is not doing as much work in these proposals as it could. Sachs' 
and Ludington's proposals are substantively similar to those made 
                                                                                                             
113 Eric Jorstad, The Privacy Paradox, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1503, 
1511-12 (2001). 
114 See Benjamin R. Sachs, Consumerism and Information Privacy: How 
Upton Sinclair Can Again Save Us from Ourselves, 95 VA. L. REV. 205, 231-33 
(2009). 
115 See id. at 219-23 (providing a discussion of the four primary breach of 
privacy issues and their effects on individuals). 
116 Id. at 240. 
117 Id. at 219-23. 
118 See generally Solove, supra note 98 (discussing the database model of 
privacy). 
119 See Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data Traders: A Tort for the 
Misuse of Personal Information, 66 MD. L. REV. 140, 171-72 (2006). 
120 Id. at 171-87 (discussing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b), (d)-(e) (2006)). 
816 WIDENER LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19 
by scholars who have not relied on the metaphor.121 Indeed, the 
database-centric Fair Information Practice approach has been the 
basis for most of the information privacy law the United States 
actually has.122 To the extent that we seek a common-law tort 
metaphor for imposing a duty to carry out back-end data 
processing securely and confidentially, Danielle Citron's 
invocation of strict liability under Rylands v. Fletcher may be even 
more on point than products liability.123 In her description, large 
"reservoirs" of personal data are akin to large reservoirs of water: 
both are liable to cause great damage if their contents escape.124 
The duty to handle personal data securely has relatively little to do 
with how the data was acquired: the same concerns arise whether it 
is consciously entered into an online quiz or generated invisibly by 
a grocery-store scanner. 
Instead, the greatest–and, so far, largely untapped–potential of 
the product safety metaphor is on the front end. The parts of an 
online service that users actually see and interact with are more 
like a 'product' than the largely invisible back-end data processing. 
Users have expectations about what the service will do; a site that 
acts otherwise frustrates those expectations. A site that violates 
their privacy causes harms, and when those harms are preventable 
with better design choices or more careful programming, it makes 
sense to ask whether the site operator should be held accountable 
for them. What follows, then, are a few thoughts about how 
                                                                                                             
121 See, e.g., Corey A. Ciocchetti, The Future of Privacy Policies: A 
Privacy Nutrition Label Filled with Fair Information Practices, 26 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 27-30, 44-45 (2008). 
122 See Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 922 
(2009) ("Overall, the approach in the United States to information privacy law in 
the private sector has been through sector-specific laws containing [Fair 
Information Practices], which have been enacted by federal and state 
lawmakers."). 
123 See Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of 
Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 
241, 244 (2007) (citing Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 
(H.L.)). 
124 Id. at 278-80. Citron also raises institutional and societal parallels 
similar to those that Sachs and Jorstad invoke. Compare id. at 280-83 (citations 
omitted), with Sachs, supra note 114, at 231-32, and Jorstad, supra note 113, at 
1511-12. 
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product-safety law–principally, the branch of tort law known as 
products liability–may have useful lessons for thinking about 
privacy and social software. 
B. The Basics of Product Safety Law 
The starting point of the simile is the starting point of products 
liability: holding sellers liable for the harms their products cause. 
As the Restatement puts it, "One engaged in the business of selling 
or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a 
defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or 
property caused by the defect."125 This rule, simple as it may seem, 
has several important consequences. 
The first point implicit in the basic duty of sellers to make 
their products safe is that sellers can be held liable even when the 
consumer is at fault in the accident.126 The consumer's recovery 
may be reduced by principles of comparative fault,127 but the seller 
could still be held liable for selling the consumer a defective 
product in the first place.128 All that is required is the usual but-for 
and proximate causal connection.129 Even the consumer who 
                                                                                                             
125 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 (1998). 
126 See id. § 1 cmt. a. 
Courts early began imposing liability without fault on product sellers for 
harm caused by such defects, holding a seller liable for harm caused by 
manufacturing defects even though all possible care had been exercised by 
the seller in the preparation and distribution of the product. In doing so, 
courts relied on the concept of warranty, in connection with which fault has 
never been a prerequisite to liability. 
Id. 
127 Id. § 17(a). Evaluating the user's actual conduct under comparative fault 
is more respectful of his or her agency than a broad rule that the social network 
site has no duty at all to him or her, which makes the user's own conduct 
irrelevant under all circumstances. 
128 See id. 
129 See id. § 15 ("Whether a product defect caused harm to persons or 
property is determined by the prevailing rules and principles governing 
causation in tort."); DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW §§ 11.1-.2, 
12.1-.3 (2d ed. 2008) (providing a discussion of cause in fact, proximate cause, 
and the various "[t]ests and [p]roof of [c]ausation"); John D. Rue, Note, 
Returning to the Roots of the Bramble Bush: The 'But For' Test Regains Primacy 
in Causal Analysis in the American Law Institute's Proposed Restatement 
(Third) of Torts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2679, 2719-20 (2003) (discussing the 
American Law Institute Reporters' support for the but-for causation rule). 
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misuses the product can sometimes recover; after all, certain kinds 
of misuse are foreseeable at the time of sale.130  If Andrea was 
careless in sharing her photos with the New York network, this 
was a carelessness that Facebook, arguably, should have 
anticipated and guarded against. 
A second implicit point in the basic duty of sellers to make 
their products safe is that disclaimers are not a substitute for a safe 
product. The Restatement makes disclaimers unenforceable "for 
harm to persons,"131 and many states have laws forbidding the 
disclaimer of product warranties.132 This rule has particular 
importance for services like Facebook, which require users to 
'consent' to contractual agreements when they sign up, along the 
way disclaiming all liability on Facebook's part for any harms in 
this life or the next.133 The products liability paradigm calls into 
question the appropriateness of allowing such waivers.134 
A third point is that sellers are liable for generic design defects 
as well as for individual manufacturing defects.135 Even if 
                                                                                                             
130 OWEN, supra note 129, § 13.5 (explaining the doctrine of misuse). 
131 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 18 (1998). 
132 OWEN, supra note 129, § 4.9 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-2-
316(5) (West 2009); ALA. CODE § 7-2-316(5), -719(4) (LexisNexis 2006); D.C. 
CODE § 28:2-316.01 (2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-316(5) (1995); 
MD. CODE ANN. COM. LAW § 2-316.1 (LexisNexis 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 106, § 2-316A (West 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-315.1, -719(4) 
(1972); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:2-316(4) (1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-
2-329(2) to (3)(a) (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-316(5) (1994); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 62A.2-316(4) (2007)). 
133 See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, Facebook, 
http://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last visited May 14, 2010) ("WE ARE 
PROVIDING FACEBOOK 'AS IS' WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED 
WARRANTIES . . . OUR AGGREGATE LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF 
THIS STATEMENT OR FACEBOOK WILL NOT EXCEED THE GREATER 
OF ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($100) OR THE AMOUNT YOU HAVE 
PAID US IN THE PAST TWELVE MONTHS."). 
134 See Michael D. Scott, Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software: 
Has the Time Finally Come?, 67 MD. L. REV. 425, 436-41, 456-57, 471 (2008) 
(discussing contractual waivers). 
135 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(a)-(b) (1998). The 
substantive standard of liability differs between them: manufacturing defects are 
judged according to a rule of strict liability, whereas design defects are judged 
according to a more negligence-like, risk-utility calculus. Compare id. § 2(a) 
(manufacturing defects), with id. § 2(b) (design defects). 
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troublesome in practice,136 this equivalence makes intuitive sense. 
A gas tank manufactured with slipshod welding and one designed 
with excessively thin walls will cause the same damage if they 
rupture and explode, and the carmaker is equally culpable for 
selling an exploding car.137 Given that the most striking privacy 
harms on Facebook stem from design mistakes, rather than one-off 
bugs afflicting individual users, it again makes sense not to take 
design decisions off the table entirely.138 
This attention to design is a critical and valuable feature of 
products liability law. The Restatement explicitly requires courts to 
consider the costs and benefits of the design alternatives open to 
the seller; the definition of a design defect requires proof that the 
actual design was inferior to a "reasonable alternative design" that 
would have prevented the harm.139 The court, in other words, must 
                                                                                                             
136 See generally James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of 
Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 
COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973) (discussing the difficulties faced by courts in 
rendering judgments concerning design defects). 
137 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 3 & cmt. b (1998). 
[O]occasionally a product design causes the product to malfunction in a 
manner identical to that which would ordinarily be caused by a 
manufacturing defect . . . Section 3 allows the trier of fact to draw the 
inference that the product was defective whether due to a manufacturing 
defect or a design defect. Under those circumstances, the plaintiff need not 
specify the type of defect responsible for the product malfunction. 
Id. 
138 Cf. Scott, supra note 134, at 459-60, 467-70 (discussing ambiguity of 
software defects between "manufacturing" and "design").  I would add that the 
replicability of software means that every user's copy of the "product" is actually 
identical. See generally James Grimmelmann, Note, Regulation by Software, 
114 YALE L.J. 1719 (2005) (discussing the predictable consequences of using 
software as a regulator). This fact collapses the most obvious distinction 
between manufacturing defects (in which a single product falls short of the usual 
standard for its class) and design defects (in which the entire class falls short). 
Michael Scott would make the distinction based on the point during the software 
production process at which the mistake was introduced. Scott, supra note 134, 
at 459. I am not so sure. In addition to the evidentiary costs of such an approach, 
it seems unnecessary in light of the purposes of products liability law. Whether 
Facebook ought to be liable for users' privacy harms ought to depend on policy 
choices and evidence of the specific software features at issue, rather than 
details of the software design and testing process. 
139 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998); OWEN, 
supra note 129, § 8.5. 
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think through the same kinds of tradeoffs that a reasonable seller 
would–which puts legal pressure on actual sellers to choose better 
overall designs. While Facebook is not about to explode like a 
poorly designed gas tank–its privacy harms are extensions of 
"normal" use rather than catastrophic accidents–there are ways in 
which better designs can make it more privacy-safe. 
For one thing, good product design discourages or prevents 
particularly hazardous uses. For example, guards on a punch press 
keep the operator from sticking his or her hand in at the wrong 
time,140 while the safety on a pistol protects the user who drops 
it.141 Similarly, good software interfaces can suggest low-risk 
actions and make high-risk ones less tempting. Facebook already 
uses this principle to good effect. Its private messages have a 
'reply' button but no 'forward' button–you cannot, within Facebook 
itself, easily violate the privacy of your correspondents.142 That is a 
smart, safe design choice. 
For another thing, good product design makes consequences 
predictable. Sharp spinning blades can be handled safely–provided 
you know where they are. The on-by-default New York City 
network that caused Andrea and Bono such trouble was a feature 
with unintuitive, hard-to-predict consequences.143 Similarly, the 
reason that Beacon and News Feed were such disruptive, 
destructive changes is that nothing Facebook had done–indeed, 
nothing anyone had done–prepared users for the sudden shift in 
how their personal information would be used.144 The smaller the 
gap between expected and actual exposure, the safer; good design 
can help close that gap. 
                                                                                                             
140 See, e.g., Rhoads v. Service Mach. Co., 329 F. Supp. 367, 369-70, 376-
77 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (holding that a manufacturer's failure to equip a press with 
safety guards raised a jury question on the defendant's negligence). 
141 See, e.g., Sturm, Ruger, & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 41, 44 (Alaska 
1979) (holding that a gun manufacturer may be liable for a defective safety on a 
pistol). 
142 Cf. Accidental Privacy Spills, supra note 70, at 8 (discussing the 
feasibility of software limits on forwarding). 
143 See Bono's Bikini Party, supra note 53. 
144 See Grimmelmann, supra note 6, at 1200-02 (discussing the dangers of 
unpredictable software "lurches"). 
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Product safety law also scrutinizes consumers' expectations 
about products.145 While the 'consumer expectations' test itself–
which focuses on consumers' expectations of how safe a product 
should be, rather than on how they expect it to function–is 
troublesome to apply in practice;146 in a broader sense, consumer 
expectations pervade products liability. If consumers were 
perfectly informed about exactly what a device would do in every 
case, there would be no accidents.  They would not have bought 
the trampoline with the wobbly leg or they would not have done 
handstands on it or they would have stopped jumping a minute 
sooner. Every accident is an example of frustrated consumer 
expectations. Asking how its users expect Facebook to work–and 
when their expectations go wrong–again directs our attention to the 
right place. 
In addition to scrutinizing design decisions, products safety 
law also pays attention to the quality of warnings.147 A good 
warning can point out hidden dangers to help a user avoid them or 
even make an informed decision to avoid the product entirely.148 
Here again, tort law shows some common sense. Some defects are 
so obvious that there is no duty to warn against them;149 others are 
so serious that no warning can cure them.150 Facebook's blistering 
pace of design innovation has often outstripped its ability to 
document the changes or explain them clearly to users.151 Sensible 
                                                                                                             
145 See generally Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1700 (2003) (discussing the role of consumer expectations in 
product safety law). 
146 See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Consumer 
Expectations' Last Hope: A Reply to Professor Kysar, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1791, 1792 (2003). 
147 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(c) (1998). 
148 See Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 170 F.3d 264, 270 (2d Cir. 1999). 
149 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. j (1998) ("In 
general, a product seller is not subject to liability for failing to warn or instruct 
regarding risks and risk-avoidance measures that should be obvious to, or 
generally known by, foreseeable product users."). 
150 See, e.g., Glittenberg v. Doughboy Recreational Indus., 491 N.W.2d 
208, 216 (Mich. 1992) (citation omitted) ("A warning is not a Band-Aid to cover 
a gaping wound, and a product is not safe simply because it carries a warning."). 
151 See, e.g., Posting of Jason Kincaid to TechCrunch, 
http://techcrunch.com/ (Apr. 6, 2009) ("Facebook can be downright baffling for 
new users."). 
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policy would focus on encouraging Facebook to make salient a few 
truly important facts about how it works, with good contextual 
help for the rest. 
In at least one important respect, Facebook is in a better 
position than most product sellers. Given the fact that the products 
are out in the wild wreaking havoc, even the seller who learns of 
the dangers may not be able to do much to limit the harms–or its 
liability. Contrariwise, products liability law recognizes only 
limited duties of postsale warning152 and recall,153 so there is little 
legal pressure to make existing products safer. Facebook, however, 
runs a service that can be patched on the fly.154 Facebook has used 
this power to ill effect with Beacon and News Feed, but when it 
turned off geographic networks, it instantly improved privacy for 
all its users.155 
Finally, perhaps the most important lesson of product safety 
law is that there is no silver bullet. The field is complicated and 
controversial, as one might expect when the stakes can be so high. 
Nor has product-safety law made products fully safe. As of this 
writing, Toyota has recalled 9,000,000 cars to fix faulty gas pedals 
and brakes.156 Tort law is a useful tool as part of a comprehensive 
effort but is not a solution by itself. Regulation, tort liability, 
consumer education, and conscientious design all play into making 
products physically safe; we should expect them all to play a role 
in making social software safe for users' privacy.157 
                                                                                                             
152 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 10 (1998). 
153 Id. § 11. 
154 See generally Randal C. Picker, Rewinding Sony: The Evolving 
Product, Phoning Home and the Duty of Ongoing Design, 55 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 749 (2005). 
155 Story & Stone, supra note 32, at C1; Schmidt, supra note 31; Posting of 
Mark Zuckerberg to The Facebook Blog, supra note 55. 
156 See Micheline Maynard, Toyota's Woes Grow as Prius Is Questioned, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2010, at A1. 
157 See Sachs, supra note 114, at 233-34, 237 (discussing a combination of 
regulatory and tort approaches to product safety and drawing inspiration for 
online privacy protection). 
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C. A Case Study: Google Buzz 
To illustrate the value of the product-safety frame, consider a 
ripped-from-the-headlines example of privacy trouble: Google 
Buzz.158 This new service from the search giant is a mash-up of    
e-mail, blogging, and social networking.159 Buzz users post items 
such as photos, videos, random thoughts, and hyperlinks in order 
to share them with others.160 These items can then be viewed and 
commented on by other Buzz users.161 What differentiates Buzz 
from a blog is its tight integration with e-mail. Gmail users can 
receive Buzz updates the same way they receive regular e-mails, 
and reply to them too, all within Gmail.162 Google also built social-
networking features into Buzz at a deep level: choosing other users 
whose updates you want to follow is as easy as clicking a 
checkbox to let Buzz import your list of most-e-mailed contacts 
from Gmail.163 
It was this last design decision that caused the privacy trouble. 
Google also required Buzz users to set up public profile pages–
public profile pages that listed their Buzz contacts.164 Turning on 
Buzz, therefore, automatically published a list of users' most-e-
mailed Gmail contacts.165 In Nicholas Carlson's words, this step 
"made Google Buzz a danger zone for reporters, mental health 
professionals, cheating spouses and anyone else who didn't want to 
tell the world who they emailed or chatted with most."166 For a 
                                                                                                             
158 Google Buzz, http://www.google.com/buzz (last visited May 14, 2010). 
159 See Posting of Edward Ho to Gmail Blog, 
http://gmailblog.blogspot.com/ (Feb. 9, 2010, 11:00 EST) (describing Buzz). 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Posting of Todd Jackson to Gmail Blog, http://gmailblog.blogspot.com/ 
(Feb. 13, 2010, 15:53 EST). 
164 See Nicholas Carlson, WARNING: Google Buzz Has a Huge Privacy 
Flaw, BUS. INSIDER: SILICON ALLEY INSIDER, Feb. 10, 2010, 
http://www.businessinsider.com/warning-google-buzz-has-a-huge-privacy-flaw-
2010-2. 
165 Id. 
166 Nicholas Carlson, How Google Went into "Code Red" and Saved 
Google Buzz, BUS. INSIDER: SILICON ALLEY INSIDER, Feb. 16, 2010, 
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-google-went-into-code-red-and-saved-
google-buzz-2010-2 [hereinafter Carlson, Code Red]. 
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business lawyer conducting confidential negotiations or a criminal 
lawyer corresponding with witnesses, this kind of exposure could 
easily be a sanctionable violation of client confidences.167 Others 
had even more to fear. As blogger Harriet Jacobs wrote: 
 
I use my private Gmail account to email my boyfriend and my 
mother.                                                                                   
There's a BIG drop-off between them and my other "most 
frequent" contacts. 
You know who my third most frequent contact is? 
My abusive ex-husband. 
Which is why it's SO EXCITING, Google, that you 
AUTOMATICALLY allowed all my most frequent contacts 
access to my Reader, including all the comments I've made on 
Reader items, usually shared with my boyfriend, who I had NO 
REASON to hide my current location or workplace from, and 
never did.168 
As a political analyst put it, "If I were working for the Iranian 
or the Chinese government, I would immediately dispatch my 
Internet geek squads to check on Google Buzz accounts for 
political activists and see if they have any connections that were 
previously unknown to the government."169 Google quickly moved 
to turn off this feature,170 but not before triggering both a Federal 
                                                                                                             
167 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2008); see also 
United States v. Monnat, 853 F. Supp. 1301, 1305 (D. Kan. 1994) (citation 
omitted) (discussing the identity of a client as confidential information). 
168 See Posting of Robin Wauters to TechCrunch, http://techcrunch.com/ 
(Feb. 12, 2010) (quoting Posting of Harriet Jacobs to Fugitivus, 
http://fugitivus.wordpress.com/ (Feb. 11, 2010) (entitled "Fuck You, Google")). 
In a fitting twist, the original post has been password-protected, presumably for 
privacy reasons.  See Posting of Harriet Jacobs to Fugitivus, supra. 
169 Net Effect, http://neteffect.foreignpolicy.com/ (Feb. 11, 2010, 06:20 
EST). 
170 See Helft, Anger, supra note 107. 
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Trade Commission (FTC) complaint171 and a class-action 
lawsuit.172 
The book on Buzz is still open, but in the mere eight days 
from launch to lawsuit, the debate over Buzz hit on almost every 
point made above as to why product safety is a useful frame for 
thinking about privacy-threatening social software. Buzz as a 
whole is a powerful, possibly revolutionary product173–however, it 
also launched with a serious design defect. Just as an otherwise 
useful buzzsaw is still unreasonably dangerous to life and limb if it 
sports a flimsy handle, the auto-add feature made the otherwise 
useful Buzz unreasonably dangerous to users' privacy. 
In particular, Buzz was dangerous because it abused users' 
expectations. E-mail address books are traditionally private. By 
default, so is the list of blogs you read. Even Facebook, which 
officially treats your list of contacts as publicly available, does not 
by default push the complete list out to a publicly accessible 
webpage.174 When Buzz made users' contact lists public, it used 
their information in a way that none of their previous experience 
had primed them to expect. 
This by itself need not have been fatal. There is a first time for 
everything, including new forms of social software. However, 
Google's innovative Buzz design was poorly documented: the 
window asking permission to create a user profile did not explain 
that its "publicly viewable follower lists are made up of people you 
most frequently email and chat with."175 Nor did Google clearly 
explain how to undo the move once users realized what 
happened.176 Instead, it fell to bloggers to create their own guides 
to disabling Buzz, adding increasingly detailed instructions as they 
                                                                                                             
171 Complaint, Request for Investigation, Injunction, and Other Relief at 1, 
In re Google, Inc., F.T.C. (Feb. 16, 2010), available at http://epic.org/ 
privacy/ftc/googlebuzz/GoogleBuzz_Complaint.pdf. 
172 See generally Class Action Complaint, Hibnick v. Google, Inc., No. 
5:10-cv-00672-JW (N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2010), available at http://docs.justia. 
com/cases/federa/district-courts/california/candce/5:2010cv00672/224341/1/. 
173 See, e.g., Posting of Tim O'Reilly to O'Reilly Radar, http://radar. 
oreilly.com/ (Feb. 9, 2010, 11:00 EST). 
174 See Privacy Policy, supra note 106. 
175 Carlson, supra note 164. 
176 See Jessica Dolcourt, Buzz Off: Disabling Google Buzz, CNET, Feb. 11, 
2010, http://news.cnet.com/8301-17939_109-10451703-2.html. 
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painstakingly reconstructed how Buzz worked.177 In product-safety 
terms, Google failed to supply Buzz with sufficient instructions 
and warnings. Even if opening up your list of contacts to the world 
was a user mistake, it was an eminently foreseeable mistake that 
Google should have expected and guarded against.178 
What is more, Google had reasonable alternative designs 
available to it. The first change Google made to Buzz was to add 
an explicit checkbox to the sign-up process, allowing users to show 
or hide their lists of contacts on their profile.179 This checkbox 
could have been present all along; it was clearly achievable and 
imposed few costs on Buzz's utility.180 Ultimately, Google disabled 
the auto-add feature entirely, merely providing suggestions of 
other users to follow.181 At the same time, Google made Buzz 
easier to disable entirely.182 In addition to demonstrating the 
existence of feasible but less dangerous designs, this rapid 
response also illustrates the importance of being able to patch a 
software service on the fly.183 Whether and to what extent Google 
ought to be held liable in the pending FTC complaint and lawsuit 
are more difficult questions–but the power of the product-safety 
approach in cutting straight to the essentials of the Buzz story 
should be clear. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
I am not calling for the direct application of products liability 
law to online privacy. For one thing, some doctrines of products-
liability law, taken at face value, would bar its application to 
privacy harms altogether. For example, products liability tort suits 
                                                                                                             
177 See, e.g., Dolcourt, supra note 176. 
178 See, e.g., Raw Meat, http://qblog.aaronsw.com/post/400531264/heres-
to-the-crazy-ones (Feb. 20, 2010) ("Buzz is a clear example that testing on 
Google employees just isn't enough.") 
179 See Nicholas Carlson, Google Buzz Still Has Major Privacy Flaw,    
BUS. INSIDER: SILICON ALLEY INSIDER, Feb. 12, 2010, 
http://www.businessinsider.com/googles-nice-improvements-to-buzz-dont-
correct-major-privacy-flaw-2010-2. 
180 See id. 
181 Posting of Todd Jackson to Gmail Blog, supra note 163. 
182 See id. 
183 See Carlson, Code Red, supra note 166. 
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do not compensate plaintiffs for economic loss and other 
nonphysical injuries184 and are limited to defective "products."185 
These doctrines serve important gatekeeping functions within 
product liability law itself, and blithely discarding them is likely to 
do violence both to products liability and to privacy law.186 
Moreover, products-liability law has its own doctrinal problems, 
such as the confused split of authority between risk-utility 
balancing and consumer expectations as the test for whether a 
design is defective.187 There is no good reason to import the full 
details of these doctrines, warts and all, into privacy law. 
Instead, I am suggesting a process of thoughtful conversation 
and translation between two bodies of law that have a common 
history and more in common than scholars and lawyers sometimes 
realize. Products-liability law may not hold all of the answers to 
privacy law, but it does ask the right kind of questions to help 
make sense of the confusing world of online social privacy. In the 
words of the reporters of Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products 
Liability,188 "[t]here are no easy answers — only good 
questions."189 
                                                                                                             
184 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 21 (1998); see also 
Scott, supra note 134, at 453-56, 470-71 (discussing the economic loss rule and 
then applying it to products liability). 
185 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 19 (1998) (defining 
products); see also Scott, supra note 134, at 461-67 (discussing definition of 
software as a "product"). 
186 See, e.g., Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 169 (D. 
Conn. 2002) (holding that "Mortal Kombat" is not a " 'product' " with respect to 
information it contains, when the game was allegedly responsible for inducing 
one adolescent to believe he was a game character and to fatally stab another). 
Drop the "products" part of "products liability" without careful thought as to 
what will replace it and those who make and sell computer software will face 
forms of liability that raise serious First Amendment concerns. See, e.g., id. at 
178-82 (discussing U.S. CONST. amend. I) (describing the First Amendment's 
protection of video games). 
187 OWEN, supra note 129, §§ 5.6-.7. 
188 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. (1998) (reported by 
James A. Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski). 
189 JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS, at xxi (6th ed. 2008). 
